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Abstract: 
 
Purpose: How can public–private partnerships (PPPs) financed by social impact bonds 
(SIBs) achieve measurable indicators of social success within a short time? We undertake 
this research to find simple, reliable indicators of social success resulting from PPPs.  
Design/Methodology/Approach: We statistically analyze data from all SIB-financed projects 
worldwide in the areas of education and training, using a logistic mixed effect model. In 
addition, we use an alternative approach to analyze the predictors of outcome success within 
homelessness projects, as they offered the most complete set of information.  
Findings: We prove that the vast majority of problems associated with issuing SIBs globally 
relate to the measurable quantification of positive social impacts.  
Practical Implications: We propose a public policy for financing higher education with SIBs 
where appropriate, wherein countable results are achieved as soon as the cooperation starts 
and each stakeholder gains.  
Originality/Value: Our proposed solution ensures a trade-off between profitability and 
immediate social effect among all partners. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Private operators or public–private partnerships (PPPs) are a popular method of 
financing public investments. However, in many cases, their potential in public 
service development is devalued due to the unsatisfactory benefits received by the 
public payer or because of societies’ accessibility limitations. As the traditional 
infrastructure-based approach to PPP does not appear to have achieved expected 
levels of efficiency and effectiveness, this study focuses on the degree to which 
social impact bonds (SIBs) can serve as a benchmark for innovating policy in the 
PPP model, with strong emphasis on achieving easily quantified results due to 
generated social value. 
 
In addition, there is a gap in the research literature regarding the lack of quantifiable 
and easily obtainable SIBs issuance objectives that can be used to determine whether 
to repay the private investor within the PPP depending on whether those objectives 
were achieved or not. However, with positive, measurable social effects after the 
implementation of SIBs, both the public and private sides of PPPs could expect a 
return on the costs of SIB issuances. By shortening the waiting period for the success 
of SIB issuances under PPPs, interest in public–private cooperation, including one 
that is mainly focused on both profit and local social effect, may increase. Therefore, 
we undertake this research to help scientists and entrepreneurs look for simple, 
reliable indicators of social success resulting from public financing for PPPs. It 
should become an ordinary policy that when obtaining public financing for private 
operators, the PPP’s profit is allocated directly to both society and the PPP’s owners. 
Thus, here, we seek to present an incentive for decision-makers to shape such an 
investment financing policy; that is, one within which a part of the public–private 
profit is always allocated to specific social goals. 
 
SIBs are relatively new financial instruments designed to reward success that is 
understood to be ensuring the expected positive social and economic outcomes of an 
investment project. SIB-financed programs attract private sector entities to pre-
finance social interventions for public entities. If the program achieves the objectives 
agreed upon beforehand, the public entity repays the investor. If the program fails to 
achieve the agreed upon objectives, the investors suffer the loss.  
 
PPPs financed by SIBs within higher education are targeted at solving the problem 
of insufficient public finance, enabling potential students to take part in full-time 
doctoral studies. This may create an opportunity to gain additional sources of 
financing for students, as well as widen entrepreneurs’ social responsibility scope. 
As they get involved in higher education PPPs, students may realize their desired 
research goals and society may produce highly educated graduates. Graduates, 
despite their financial status, may develop desired research within their universities 
given sufficient financial support for their entire study period and begin cooperation 
with the potential entrepreneurs. 
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Herewith, we propose a public policy for financing higher education with SIBs 
where appropriate, wherein countable results are achieved as soon as the cooperation 
starts and each stakeholder gains. The requirements for a successful SIB issuance are 
as follows: 
• A private entrepreneur needs to bring an acceptable level of profit. 
• The public partner is keen on providing stable public service. 
• Society is more than happy with the touchable direct social impact of 
public–private cooperation.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
A PPP is a long-term agreement between private and public entities that enables the 
provision of public services. In this agreement, the private and public partners bear a 
significant risk, managing and being responsible for the outcome of the partnership 
(Yescombe, 2007). Often, studies analyze PPP in the context of obtaining “best 
practices” (Osborne, 1993) without proposing a formal model. Other studies focus 
on the effectiveness of partnerships resulting from infrastructure construction and 
management (Engel et al., 2013). This study, however, focused on PPP in the 
education sector and sought to propose a model for this context. Developing 
countries, in particular, face the problem of insufficient public funding to finance 
children and young people’s full access to education (Bray, 1999). Additionally, 
access to higher education is addressed infrequently. Postgraduate education is not 
an existential problem or a problem of great social importance on a macroeconomic 
scale.  
 
However, for developed economies, the problem of shaping the level of innovative 
knowledge may be a key argument in terms of gaining competitive advantage in 
mature markets. Just as in Silicon Valley, every developed region continues to look 
for opportunities to gain a competitive edge in the international race for innovation 
and socio-economic progress. An indispensable element of that kind of progress is 
knowledge, and advanced knowledge is often associated with higher education. PPP 
in higher education are relatively well-known solutions used in the organization and 
management of dormitories and other real estate within universities, among other 
instances. Research in this area was conducted by Blair and Williams (2017), among 
other scholars. They report that the trend toward the development of PPP in higher 
education is intriguing due to apparent changes in student housing objectives and the 
readiness of large university systems to conclude long-term public–private contracts. 
It seems that there is already a bridge for the public and private sector to use to 
engage in joint governance.  
 
To examine the trade-off between profit, public service, and social welfare, we 
search for factors that determine the formation of “fair societies,” especially in the 
context of growing disparities in the development of individual economies. Social 
welfare was defined as early as the 1970s in the works of scholars, such as John 
Rawls and his A Theory of Justice book (Nickel, 1994), Amartya Sen’s Collective 
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Choice and Social Welfare (Sen, 1970), and Ester Boserup et al.’s Women’s Role in 
Economic Development (2013). In this study’s proposed solution, a PPP project is 
financed by SIBs where social welfare means access to graduate-level learning for 
the most qualified university graduates, regardless of their wealth. Other benefits 
made explicit by the example project were those stemming from the obligation of 
doctoral students to stay in the region for a certain period and to share in the tax 
burden of the region. Increasing innovation in the region, due to the 
commercialization of scientific research developed at the university in cooperation 
with a private investor within the framework of the example PPP, would certainly 
contribute to the consolidation of inclusive social and economic policy.  
 
Rawls (1971) proposes supporting the poorest people working to reach the minimum 
subsistence level and integrating those people into society so as to maximize the 
social welfare function. Note that to date, paying for doctoral school (postgraduate 
education) has not guaranteed participants remuneration at a level that would be 
close to the national average or a salary comparable to persons with higher education 
working outside the public sphere. Furthermore, we agree with authors who proved 
that increasing education expenditure with no additional measures such as reforming 
the education system and establishing a competitive labor market does little to lower 
the levels of income inequality (Ning, 2010). 
 
Drawing attention to the need to demonstrate tangible effects of social activities 
when financing by SIB leads us to the analysis of PPP contracting. SIBs are win–win 
processes, where each party achieves the expected objectives (Fraser, 2018; 
Roumboutsos and Saussier, 2014; Warner, 2013). Bevir and Rhodes (2007), as well 
as Bevir and Richards (2009), indicated that the implementation of this type of bond 
means moving away from competitive mechanisms of contracting public services 
and moving toward contracting services on the basis of the declared result instead of 
the asking price. This is a satisfactory and expected approach for both private and 
public investors involved in a PPP. In many cases, the contracting of public services 
within PPPs is based on the parameters of the impact of the activity. The price of 
services, the value of the investment, and/or the execution and management of the 
created infrastructure do not solely determine the choice of a particular 
concessionaire/partner in a PPP. Achieving value for money and the indication of a 
measurable social impact are often the key criteria in competitive dialogue-based 
proceedings (Petersen, 2019).  
 
However, determining the measurable impact of a PPP can be difficult. The 
implementation of a financing formula that used SIBs and that could define 
quantifiable and measurable social impact factors would simplify the process of 
selecting a private partner in a competitive dialogue. We agree with Hevenstone and 
von Bergen (2020) that SIBs might promote government transparency due to 
outcome data collection and evaluation, which are part of the contractual terms. We 
disagree that SIBs might complicate public partner transparency because more 
contractual parties might lead to more uncertain data ownership as the maximum 
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profit aim transforms information into a competitive advantage. The long-term 
cooperation within PPPs guarantees the position of a quasi-monopoly (Moszoro, 
2018). Therefore, it extends this form of collaboration beyond the scope of 
competitiveness. 
 
Similar analyses of the significance of measurable SIB effects are conducted by Fox 
and Morris (2019), Carter (2019), and others. These authors describe the evaluations 
of projects using SIBs, especially the achievement of measurable social results that 
guarantee the financing of the cost of bond redemption that was assumed by a public 
entity. However, these scholars also point out the drawbacks associated with the 
measurement of social impact and the difficulty of forming conclusions about SIB 
success factors. These obstacles underscore the need to develop a standard for 
measuring the expected results of issuing SIBs for public investments.  
 
Some papers within this field underline the strong need for independent evaluations 
of SIB outcomes and impacts (Jackson, 2013). We agree with this and the need for 
fast and direct outcomes symptoms as soon as the project starts. Private investors 
want to obtain profitability within a shorter time period than is required for SIBs to 
be repaid; thus, long wait periods are inefficient to realize the social benefits of their 
investment. Furthermore, according to Dixon (2020) there is a great need to establish 
a predefined set of results that take into account the specific expectations of partners, 
especially those related to obtaining reimbursement of financing costs by SIBs. 
 
The context of SIBs in the education sector has rarely been addressed in extant 
literature. According to Joynes (2019), the author of a report on SIBs in the 
education sector, the key factor determining the organizational and financial success 
of SIBs in this sector is the precise definition of the expected social impact that must 
be achieved. Based on the parameters of all 14 educational project issues from the 
Global Social Impact Bond Database, more than 300,000 people worldwide were the 
beneficiaries of these programs (for the total number of SIB issues in the education 
sector, refer to Table 2). The most common parameter for the assessment of social 
impact in these projects was ensuring access to education for children who were 
previously excluded from the system. Unfortunately, an insignificant number of 
measurably confirmed impacts prevented us from carrying out further statistical 
analyses on 14 education projects.  
 
A study by Tse and Warner (2020) is particularly interesting and relevant to the 
goals of this study. They state that the organization of SIBs issued on a small scale 
had low-impact contributions and sometimes even limited social rights and access to 
services for others. We argue against these results, conducting our own analysis to 
prove the possibility of achieving an optimal size for a group of beneficiaries. The 
achievement of the assumed goal guarantees the success of the issuance. 
Unfortunately, we can only prove this in the case of the phenomenon of 
homelessness, rather than education. This limitation underscores the importance of 
quantifiable types of planned social impacts in assessing success from issuing SIBs. 
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For example, the percentage of the program participants who complete the education 
stage financed with SIBs could be the measure, as opposed to the general or simple 
number of people joining the program. We agree with Tse and Warner that to 
determine the success of placing SIBs in the education system, “common sense” in 
determining the expected results and impacts is necessary. These determinations 
must be consistent with the characteristics of a specific area of science or education. 
Moreover, to ensure a reliable assessment of social impact, it is necessary to have 
solid indicators of success in a properly selected period of “social” return on 
investment, as we present below.  
 
3. Methodology and Results 
 
The subject of this study includes all SIB-financed projects in the areas of education 
and training worldwide, selected from a database of 187 projects 
(golab.bsg.ox.ac.uk). The data from all SIB-financed projects worldwide undergo 
the linear mixed model analysis. Numerical variables were characterized by the 
following descriptive statistics: minimum (min), maximum (max), 1st quartile (Q1), 
median (med.), mean, and 3rd quartile (Q3). Due to the nature of analyzed data 
(multiple outcomes possible within projects), regression analysis of repeated 
measures necessitates the use of logistic mixed effect models. An outcome success is 
modeled in this way with outcome target description, capital raised, and cohort size 
as fixed effects, and project as a random variable. To accommodate for the widely 
different scales of each predictor, these variables are normalized so that both mean 
and standard deviation of each variable was equal to one. Univariate logistic mixed 
regression is used to settle the hypotheses. 
 
To determine whether the explanatory variables in a model are significant, we use 
Wald’s test, which can be employed for a multitude of different models, including 
those with binary or continuous variables. Wald’s test is used both for all model 
parameters (coefficients) and for each of them individually. In the first case, Wald’s 
test is used to test the null hypothesis that the set of model coefficients is equal to 
zero. In the second use case, a statistically significant result of Wald’s test for a 
given coefficient of the model means that it is significantly different from zero, and 
thus a relationship is detected between the predictor, which corresponds to this 
coefficient and the dependent variable. 
 
The result of Wald’s test for individual coefficients is placed in the tables with fixed 
effects of mixed models (shown in the “p-value” column). The Wald’s test result for 
the entire set of parameters is depicted in a separate table. 
 
Just over one-fifth of the 187 projects had been completed at the time of our 
analysis. Among the completed projects, the majority had missing data that made it 
impossible to analyze the project. Each project may have had several outcomes; 
however, for the purpose of further analysis, outcomes were analyzed as individual 
observations. Therefore, the success of each full project is not analyzed, only 
  Hanna Kociemska, Bogusław Półtorak 
 
429  
individual outcomes were analyzed. There were 349 different outcomes from all 
completed projects. The criterion for success of the outcome is if the outcome target 
achieved was equal to or greater than the outcome targeted. Table 1 presents the 
details of the completed projects that provided data for our study.  
 
Table 1. Extant completed projects analyzed 















2 4 2 2  
Child and family 
welfare 
32 6   6 
Criminal justice 15 3 1  2 
Education and 
early years 
26 5   5 
Employment and 
training 
50 154 2  152 
Health and 
wellbeing 
31 2   2 
Homelessness 30 175 74 76 25 
Poverty 
reduction 
2 0    
Overall 188 349 79 78 192 
Source: Own study. 
 
The dataset contains information about 187 projects from eight policy areas. The 
projects focus primarily on the following policy areas: employment and training 
(27%), child and family welfare (17%), health and wellbeing (16%), and 
homelessness (16%). An overview of capital raised for projects is presented in Table 
2. Criminal justice projects operated with the highest amount of financial support, 
followed by child and family welfare projects. 
 
Table 2. Capital raised (in £ million) 
Policy Area Min. Q1 Median Mean Q3 Max. SD Total 
Agriculture and environment 0.08 0.7 1.3 1.3 1.9 2.5 1.7 2.6 
Child and family welfare 0 0.5 1.6 2.8 3.9 13.4 3.3 63.5 
Criminal justice 0 1.5 4.8 5.3 7.5 13.7 4.5 74.6 
Education and early years 0 0.2 0.42 1.3 0.8 13 2.8 30 
Employment and training 0 0.36 0.73 2.2 1.5 33 5.5 88 
Health and wellbeing 0.04 0.44 1 1.9 1.7 15  3.2 41 
Homelessness 0.1 0.45 1 1.7 1.9 6.7 1.8 38 
Poverty reduction 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 NA 1.8 
For all policy areas 0 0.35 0.9 2.3 2.5 33 4 340 
Source: Own study. 
 
Due to the lack of data, tests are not carried out for individual industries; policy 
areas were considered collectively instead. Pearson’s correlation testing do not show 
that the number of users involved with the project or the capital raised for the project 
was related to project success. Likewise, a Fisher’s exact test finds no link between 
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the intermediary advisor and the success of the project. The test also fails to show a 
link between the project’s success and the SIB structure. Table 3 displays the results 
of this testing. 
 
Table 3. Overview of statistical hypotheses 
Hypothesis Test p-value 
The number of project users is correlated with a 
positive outcome result. 
Pearson correlation test >0.05 
Intermediary advisor influences outcome success. Fisher’s exact test >0.05 
SIB structure influences outcome success. Fisher’s exact test >0.05 
Capital raised is related to outcome success. Pearson correlation test >0.05 
Source: Own study.  
 
To validate the hypotheses, univariate logistic regression models are created, taking 
into account the random factor—the project number. For the multi-factor model of 
the mixed logistics model, the model coefficients thereof are shown in Table 4 
below.  
 
Table 4. Predictors of outcome success  
Odds ratio 2.5% CI* 97.5% CI p-value 
Outcome target description 2.714 1.699 4.594 <0.001 
Capital raised 5.21 1.107 26.958 0.042 
Cohort size 0.001 0 0.518 0.036 
Source: Own study. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The number of project users is correlated with a positive outcome 
result. 
 
Based on the mixed logistic regression model, there is no basis for the hypothesis 
that the number of project users is correlated with a positive outcome result 
(p>0.05). 
 
Table 5. The number of project users is correlated with a positive outcome result. 
Mixed model results - only for homelessness (not enough data for the rest) 
  Estimate Std. Error z value 2.5 % 97.5 % P-value 
(Intercept) -0.027 0.163 -0.163 -0.348 0.294 0.870 
cohort_size -0.059 0.164 -0.360 -0.382 0.263 0.719 
Source: Own study. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Intermediary advisor influences outcome success. 
 
Based on the mixed logistic regression model, there is no basis for the hypothesis 
that the intermediary advisor influences outcome success (p>0.05). 
 
Hypothesis 3: SIB structure influences outcome success. 
 
  Hanna Kociemska, Bogusław Półtorak 
 
431  
Based on the mixed logistic regression model, there is no basis for the hypothesis 
that the SIB structure influences outcome success (p>0.05). 
 
Table 6. Mixed model explaining outcome success by intermediary advisor  








(Intercept) 0.000 0.333 0.000 -0.659 0.659 1.000 
intermediary_advisor Social 
Finance 
0.177 0.413 0.429 -0.634 0.990 0.668 
intermediary_advisor Triodos Bank 
UK 
-0.251 0.442 -0.568 -1.125 0.616 0.570 
Source: Own study. 
 
Table 7. Mixed model explaining outcome success by SIB structure  
  Estimate Std. 
Error 




(Intercept) -0.405 0.373 -1.088 -1.162 0.315 0.277 
sib_structureIntermediated 0.560 0.670 0.836 -0.754 1.906 0.403 
sib_structureManaged 0.497 0.419 1.186 -0.316 1.339 0.235 
Source: Own study. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Capital raised is related to outcome success. 
 
Based on the mixed logistic regression model, there is no basis for the hypothesis 
that the capital raised is related to outcome success (p>0.05). 
 
Table 8. Mixed model explaining outcome success by capital raised 
  Estimate Std. Error z value 2.5 % 97.5 % P-value 
(Intercept) 0.014 0.160 0.086 -0.300 0.328 0.931 
capital_raised 0.141 0.178 0.792 -0.185 0.543 0.429 
Source: Own study. 
 
In addition to univariate statistics, an alternative approach is used in the analysis of 
the predictors of outcome success. For this analysis, only projects from the area of 
homelessness are analyzed as they contained the most complete set of information. 
While homelessness is not thematically consistent with the education sphere, it 
demonstrates similar methodological problems related to social impact assessment in 
terms of issuing SIBs and obtaining tangible social benefits. 
 
A logistic mixed effect model of outcome success is prepared with outcome target 
description, capital raised, and cohort size as fixed effects, and project as a random 
variable. To accommodate the widely different scales of each predictor, they are 
normalized so that mean of each variable was equal to one and standard deviation 
was also equal to one.  
 
The results indicate that each of the fixed effects is indeed a significant predictor of 
project success. The largest positive effect comes from capital raised. When 
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comparing two projects that are equal in all predictor variables except capital raised, 
a one standard deviation increase above the mean of capital raised (i.e., a rise from 
£1.7m to £3.5m) increases the chances of success by factor of 5.21. While outcome 
target description has a less pronounced influence, cohort size acts as a very strong 
predictor of failure: the value of the 97.5% confidence interval indicates that an 
increase in cohort size of one standard deviation above the mean decreases chances 
of success by a factor of nearly two (1/0.518).  
 
Table 9. Predictors of outcome success. Estimated coefficients of the fixed effects of 
multifactorial mixed model explaining outcome success 
 Estimate 2.5% CI 97.5% CI P-value 
Intercept -3.66 -7.44 -0.11 0.049 
Outcome target 
description (scaled) 
0.999 0.53 1.52 <0.001 
Capital raised 
(scaled) 
1.651 0.10 3.29 0.042 
Cohort -7.377 -14.55 -0.66 0.036 
Source: Own study. 
 
Table 10. Predictors of outcome success. Fixed effects of multifactorial mixed model 
explaining outcome success – odds ratios calculated on the basis of the model 
coefficients  
Odds ratio 2.5% CI 97.5% CI P-value 
Outcome target description 2.714 1.699 4.594 <0.001 
Capital raised 5.21 1.107 26.958 0.042 
Cohort size 0.001 0 0.518 0.036 
Source: Own study. 
 
Table 11. Wald’s test results (for the set of model coefficients described in Table 9)] 
2 df P-value 
16.3 3 <0.001 
Source: Own study. 
 
Figure 1 displays the interdependency of the analyzed predictors visualized in a 
graphical form. As the figure demonstrates, the chances of success decrease very 
rapidly with increasing cohort size. 
 
Summing up, due to the lack of data, analysis is somewhat limited. None of the 
statistical tests show correlations between outcome success and various individual 
factors. However, when we compare cohort size and capital raised simultaneously 
with the project’s success, interesting relationships emerge. Not much can be said 
about the overall success of the projects, with the success of around 80% of them 
still unassigned. This study’s proposed PPP organizational solution would guarantee 
transparency in the process of assessing measurable social effects during the lifetime 
of the PPP project. A financial agreement structure for SIB-financed PPP projects 
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would enable broader yearly benchmarking of SIB emissions globally, offering a 
measurable SIB success rate. 
 
Figure 1. How raised capital and cohort size relate to outcome success 
Source: Own compilation. All calculations were performed in the R program (ver. 
4.0.2) 
 




Interpreting the results obtained through analysis, we attempted to establish an 
organizational solution in which the defects of the existing SIB issuance processes 
could be avoided. The difficulty in this task, raised by many researchers and 
confirmed in this study, was that there was no way to quickly quantify the positive 
impact to the public and the private sides of the investment financed by SIBs. While 
the proposed organization and structure of the SIB issue by a public university is 
based, in this particular case, on running a public–private doctoral school, that does 
not mean that the same scheme cannot be applied in another sector of public–private 
cooperation that could be financed by SIBs.  
 
The organization begins with the establishment of a public–private company in 
which shares are held by a private investor, a public higher education institution, and 
a local government unit. The aim of the established entity is to develop and conduct 
scientific research within the doctoral school. Private-partner involvement is meant 
to increase the possibility of commercializing research and employing graduates in 
research and business positions in private companies in the region.  
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The inclusion and presence of a local government unit offer an opportunity to 
translate the results of research work, as well as the scientific and professional 
activity of doctoral students, into broadly understood local social welfare efforts. 
This transformation can be accomplished by not only implementing the results of 
research work within the region but also retaining the doctoral school graduates in 
the region, where they become taxpayers.  
 
A popular argument is that more funding is needed to increase the effectiveness of 
research conducted by universities. Again, this objective can be fulfilled by issuing 
SIBs that supplement the public research-funding system. The choice to employ the 
SIB instrument is made to achieve positive financial flow that results from the 
implementation of a financed investment. Therefore, it is possible to imagine that 
SIBs can finance public–private prisons, schools, kindergartens, water supply 
companies, and other projects, but only if achieving positive financial results is a 
possibility. Note that the expected profitability of a project financed by SIBs is an 
additional powerful equivalent response and incentive for the capital provider 
questioning the positive social impact of the project.  
 
The positive social impact for a public–private prison partnership could be a 
reduction in recidivism levels within a certain number of years following release. 
For a school, success could be determined by financing scholarships for talented 
students from disadvantaged families, by purchasing educational materials, or by 
increasing access to education for children previously excluded from the system, 
among other potential measures. In this study’s example of a doctoral school, a 
crucial element would be providing scholarships for doctoral students to allow the 
students to engage in scientific activities full-time. Until now, positive solutions like 
this one have not existed. In fact, financing options that allow students to attend 
doctoral schools are so unsatisfactory that the students are forced to undertake work 
outside the university.  
 
Within the university, conducting research is considered an additional activity, often 
a short-term activity due to the low salaries offered to doctoral students. It is even 
more difficult for universities to onboard private enterprises as research sponsors. 
PPPs financed with SIBs have never been a standard for the development of 
research, especially in Central and Eastern European countries and in areas of 
science where it is difficult to commercialize research outcomes and results. The 
problems are not only due to legal systems that solely enable public funding of 
science and research, but also due to the essence of research activities, not all of 
which have to be commercially viable.  
 
The solution suggested by our study, financing a doctoral school by SIBs, guarantees 
positive, measurable effects for each of the partners in the PPP. Figure 2 displays the 
potential positive effects obtained from financing a PPP through SIBs in the doctoral 
school environment.  
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Figure 2. Positive effects from SIB-financed PPP   
   
 
Source: Own study. 
 
As with any commercial company, each partner in a PPP has the right to obtain 
dividends. An additional benefit for a private investor would be the opportunity to 
commercialize research and increase the investor’s own innovation. When graduates 
of a doctoral school are obliged to stay in the region for a certain period after 
obtaining their degrees, a local government unit partner gains taxpayers and the 
prestige associated with a region that cares about the levels of access to education 
and education quality. The university partner enjoys increased levels of research 
funding and the ability to differentiate funding sources.  
 
As proved within the literature review, the vast majority of problems associated with 
issuing SIBs globally relate to the measurable quantification of the positive social 
impacts that result from that issuance. In this study, we suggest that the success of 
the PPP should be measured by the number of doctoral school graduates. Assuming 
that 3–5 years of full-time study are necessary to obtain the doctoral degree, the first 
positive social impact would be anticipated for the project’s sixth year; that is, when 
the first program graduates would start working and become local taxpayers.  
 
Other potential success indicators to be considered are the value of commercialized 
research results carried out by the students and the number of university graduates 
employed by the private investor within the PPP. What is most important is 
determining a quantifiable and measurable indicator; if or when that indicator is 
achieved, the cost of the financing obtained from the private business investor would 
be covered by the local government unit of that PPP. It significantly limits the time 
to archive the success and apply for SIB issuance cost repayment. As the SIB 
issuance payback period (financial success) might be set within 12–15 years, the 
measurable social effects (number of doctorate degrees obtained) might be realized 
far quicker (within 6 years).  
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This study also investigated and objectively assessed the costs of organizing a PPP 
project financed with SIBs, in which the partners arrive at a compromise between 
profit and positive social impact. For the local government unit, the burden of 
achieving the expected social impacts will be covering the cost of SIB financing. 
The public university will face the burden associated with spinning off a part of its 
activities to establish a commercial company. These burdens may include lower 
levels of public subsidies, due to the commercialization of the university’s activities. 
The private investor will have to account for the lower profitability of educational 
services; thus, the possibility of a satisfactory positive financial result arises, not 
only from the ongoing operation of the doctoral school but also from the 
commercialization of the research results.  
 
5. Conclusions and Further Research Implications 
 
The use of SIBs as an instrument in PPP makes finding a compromise possible in 
terms of both maximizing an investor company’s value and ensuring social welfare. 
The business objective of maximizing profits does not have to be abandoned or 
conflated to be a purely philanthropic activity. To maintain their market positions by 
cooperating with the public payer (quasi-public monopoly, where the private 
investor cooperates with the public payer to deliver social/public services/products), 
profit-oriented entities may be interested in distributing their profits, making a direct 
impact on public-service satisfaction levels among their “customers” and being 
rewarded for their success by the public payer. The proposed PPP model that uses 
the SIB instrument is an example of a win–win–win project.  
 
The results of our statistical analyses confirm that the larger the group of potential 
participants, the lower the chances of project success. The statistical analysis only 
yielded this result when we moved from testing individual factors to combining 
cohort size and capital raised, and simultaneously comparing that data with project 
success.  
 
We acknowledge the shortcomings or limitations of this study. The first is a 
methodological limitation; there have been only a small number of SIB-financed 
projects completed and, of course, a small number of associated public evaluation 
reports. The second limitation results from us comparing social impacts over a short 
timeframe, up to 5 years after project completion. An evaluation that fully illustrates 
social change may require a longer period and the comparison of identical public 
services. In addition, individual public services may not translate rapidly into 
measurable overall welfare or measurable social impact. The development of 
financial instruments, such as SIBs, however, requires a skillful demonstration of 
positive social impact in the short term. Achieving this impact is a prerequisite for 
the public entity involved in the project that applies for financing-cost coverage 
(costs that may include interest, the issue process, and/or the full redemption cost). 
Third, in our study’s example, the process of financing PPP by SIBs focused on 
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educational services only; other industries were not covered due to methodological 
limitations.  
 
It is worth noting that the strong development of SIBs and PPP may lead to 
permanent changes in attitudes about achieving positive social impact in all public 
services. However, some positive social impacts are not tangible, although they do 
translate to higher Human Development Index results. For example, the social 
benefit from defense (military) projects is not likely to be of interest to private 
investors, due to low profitability. 
 
The most important contribution of this study is the presentation of the possibility of 
change; it is possible to depart from the canon of governance, based solely on 
maximizing company value or profit. We dispute the claim that a changed and multi-
faceted objective is overarching for private stakeholders, emphasizing that it is 
possible to achieve a compromise between profitability and an investment’s positive 
social impact within the framework of a PPP. While this idea may not be popular, it 
belongs with current heterodox economic theories that increasingly overturn the 
foundations of capitalism, that is, maximizing the value of a project in favor of a 
philanthropic face. The success of SIB-financed PPPs is based on a compromise 
between public and private partners, in which every stakeholder sacrifices some 
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